Introduction
There are many accounts of what people need perhaps because there are many reasons why one might want such an account. One reason one might want an account of needs is that needs are supposed to provide a plausible basis for what a decent society must enable its members to secure. Needs compete with welfare, opportunity, resource, and capability accounts of the currency of justice and there are many compelling arguments that a decent society must enable its members secure what they need (Pogge, 2002; Vallentyne, 2005; Alkire, 2002; Reader, 2006; Copp, 1998; Brock, 1998; Braybrooke, 1998) .
ii So, it is important to have an account of needs that might play the requisite role in answering the question "What must a good society enable its members to secure?" After all, if no account can play this role then we should presumably answer this question by referencing a different (i.e. welfare, opportunity, resource, or capability) alternative. And without some account, we cannot even begin to evaluate the proposition that a decent society must enable its members to secure what they need.
Some suggest that a needs account might have an advantage over at least the resourcist alternative because a decent society might have to enable different people to secure different things (Reader, 2006) .
iii Some people (e.g. pregnant women) need much more food and water than others. Some (e.g. cancer victims) need more expensive medicines or health care. So, any good account of needs, that might help explain what a decent society must enable its members to secure, must accommodate differences in individuals' needs. Differences that result, for instance, from differences in individual constitution and from the fact that individuals occupy different positions in society (Brock, 1998; Frankfurt, 1988) . Ideally, a good account should capture all of the things each person needs without including anything someone does not need. This paper will provide an account that can both (1) provide a plausible basis for what a decent society must enable its members to secure and (2) accommodate these individual differences in need. It will argue, however, that none of the most plausible alternative accounts of needs can fulfill these desiderata.
More precisely, section II sketches what we can call the minimally good human life account of needs. and the Human Good," so that it suggests that to live a minimally good human life "one must love something, what one loves must be worth loving, and one must be related in the right way to what one loves" (Kraut, 1994, 44) . vii On these perfectionist theories, whether or not one lives a minimally good human life is not a completely subjective matter. Rather, a minimally good human life must be choice-worthy and a life in which one can make some significant choices.
viii One must be free to shape one's own life, whether or not one thinks one needs to be able to do so, to live a minimally good human life (Nussbaum, 2000, 72) . ix One must be able to live autonomously. On Arneson's suggested adaptation of Hurka's theory, for instance, the minimally good human life includes the kind of practical and theoretical reason that we will suggest is essential to autonomy since humans are not only physical objects but, more remarkably, living rational animals.
x Similarly, on Kraut's theory, the minimally good human life requires making appropriate autonomous choices. We need to be able to reflect and evaluate to be related in the right way to the valuable things we love; our good is grounded "in our capacity for rational choice" (Kraut, 1994, 48) .
Autonomy may have more or less importance on different perfectionist theories. But because humans are essentially or distinctively autonomous creatures, any plausible perfectionist theory should support the conclusion that autonomy is essential to a minimally good human life. Or so we will argue. This will not only add some content to the minimally good human life account of needs but it will illustrate a general argumentative strategy by which on might determine what the minimally good human life requires. First, however, let us say a bit about the autonomy.
Autonomy
To secure autonomy, to shape one's life, one needs to have some freedom from both internal and external constraint. Internal freedom is roughly the capacity to decide "for oneself what is worth doing," one must be able to make "the decisions of a normative agent" --to recognize and respond to value as one sees it (Griffin 2006). One must be able to reason about and make some simple and significant plans on the basis of one's beliefs, values, desires, and goals (henceforth commitments). External freedom, or liberty, is roughly freedom from interference to pursue a "worthwhile life" (Raz 1998; Griffin 2006) . One must have some freedom from coercion and constraint; one must be able to carry out some simple and significant plans. The key difference between internal and external freedom is that the former is freedom from selfconstraint, the later freedom from environmental or other-imposed constraints. So a woman who can think for herself may have internal freedom even if she lacks external freedom because she is imprisoned. To live an autonomous life, however, more is required. One must actually exercise one's freedom --making both some simple and significant choices. And one must have at least some good options from which to choose.
Let us consider each of these conditions for autonomy in turn.
First, what does it mean to say that one must be able to reason on the basis of one's commitments?
The idea is just this: Autonomous people must have some instrumental reasoning ability. Some hold demanding conceptions of rationality on which saying that autonomy requires the ability to reason would be controversial. Kant, for instance, thinks that reason requires each of us to acknowledge the categorical imperative as unconditionally required. xi The reasoning at issue does not require this much, however.
People must have only some instrumental reasoning ability.
Next, consider what it means to say that one must be able to make some simple and significant plans on the basis of one's commitments. First, one must be able to make both some simple plans and some significant ones. To make significant plans one need not plan one's whole life or every detail of one's day.
Rather, one must be able to navigate through one's day without too much difficulty and make general plans for the future. One must not be, like Joseph Raz's proverbial man in a pit or hounded woman constrained to making plans only about how to meet one's needs. xii Though one might not choose to exercise this ability, one must have the planning ability necessary to pursue the projects one values --to pursue a good life as one sees it. This ability requires a kind of internal freedom one can have even if subject to external constraint. One must be able to form some simple and significant plans that would work if implemented.
One must be able to make some simple and significant plans that one could carry through if free from external constraint. There are many ways of making sense of this idea. One might, for instance, analyze the ability to make some simple and significant plans on the basis of one's commitments in terms of the ability to make one's motivating commitments generally coherent. Alternately, one might give a decision-theoretic analysis of planning in terms of a consistent preference ordering. Yet another option is to cash out the ability to make some simple and significant plans on the basis of one's commitments in terms of ordering one's ends perhaps by drawing on John Rawls' work on plans of life. xiii It is not necessary here to further explicate the ability to make some simple and significant plans on the basis of one's commitments since these are all standard moves in the literature on autonomy.
xiv Consider, also, what is required to carry out some simple and significant plans. This ability requires both some internal freedom and external freedom. Once again, internal freedom is roughly the capacity to decide "for oneself what is worth doing," one must be able to make "the decisions of a normative agent"; to recognize and respond to value as one sees it. xv External freedom, or liberty, is roughly freedom to pursue a "worthwhile life" without interference. xvi To carry out some simple and significant plans one must have enough freedom from coercion and constraint to carry out those actions necessary to bring some valuable plans to fruition. The importance of the qualifier some is just this: One need not be able to carry out every valuable plan that one might want to carry out to have this component of autonomy.
Still, the ability to carry out some simple and significant plans is a necessary component of this kind of autonomy.
Finally, the idea that people must have good options is tied to the idea that people must be able to reason about, make and carry out both some simple and some significant plans. Variety matters as well as number. One must be able to "exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive to exercise, as well as to decline to develop any of them" (Raz, 1998, 375 The fact that autonomy is necessary for and partly constitutive of a minimally good life can also be brought out by examples. Suppose that someone, let us call her Naima, drifts through life either making one choice then another randomly or letting others or natural circumstances choose for her. Suppose that Naima is drifting not because she has freely chosen to drift. Rather, she is drifting because she cannot reason about, make, or carry out plans. Naima cannot shape her own life. She may travel on the whimsy of chance never pursuing anything at all or may not choose consistently enough to attain anything she desires.
She may end up subject to the will of another. Naima functions poorly because her life is not truly her own.
Even if, by chance, Naima does secure many valuable things, her life will still lack an important kind of value. Her life will be like a prize won accidentally (Raz, 1998) .
Although people need not control every aspect of their lives or even be very resolute to live minimally good lives, those who lack autonomy are impaired. Because autonomy is necessary for securing many of the things that make a life go minimally well, the non-autonomous will be unable to live minimally good lives. Because autonomy is partly constitutive of such a life, even those who secure all of the other things that make a life go minimally well will not live minimally good lives.
One might object that this account of a minimally good life is too demanding. One might push this objection. One might argue, for instance, that monks lack autonomy since they must follow the rules of the monastery and give up all of their worldly possessions. Monks freely abdicate their autonomy. But, one might maintain, many monk's lives are minimally good.
This objection misunderstands the kind of autonomy that we have argued is necessary for and partly constitutive of a minimally good life. One need only have good options and be able to reason about, make, and carry out some simple and significant plans to have this kind of autonomy. Most monks pursue their ideal of a religious life and go about their daily business of praying reading, writing, cooking, gardening and so forth. So, most monks have the kind of autonomy at issue here.
III. Competing Accounts of Needs
This paper has started to cash out the minimally good human life account of needs by arguing that autonomy is necessary for and partly constitutive of a minimally good human life. But why think this provides the basis for a good account of needs? This section argues that the minimally good human life account of needs has some advantages over the most plausible alternatives: Harm and social role accounts.
It argues that neither competitor provides a satisfactory conception of needs. Finally, it shows that the minimally good human life account captures some of the advantages of these accounts and avoids some of their problems.
Before beginning, however, it is important to note that the accounts we will consider were not designed to fulfill the desiderata with which we started. Harry Frankfurt really only intends to account for the presumptive force of needs (Frankfurt, 1988) . Garrett Thompson is trying to give an account of needs that can explain why one cannot say truly that someone should have different needs (Thompson, 2005) .
xxii Braybrooke wants to give an account of what people need that can play a role in guiding public policy (Braybrooke, 1987) . Still, the accounts we will consider are amongst the best developed so it is worth seeing if they can fulfill the other criteria for a good account of needs as well as those they are supposed to fulfill. If they cannot and we are right that the minimally good human life account of needs fares better, there is at least some reason to take the minimally good human life account seriously.
Harm-Based Accounts
Harry Frankfurt in The Importance of What We Care About defends one of the most famous accounts of need. Frankfurt argues that we need those things that allow us to avoid harm when we cannot avoid harm in any other way. People need those things that are "necessarily necessary for avoiding harm" (Frankfurt, 1988, 112) . Although he does not give a complete account of harm, Frankfurt says a few things.
First, he says, one is harmed if one is made worse off than before. He also claims that, if the only way to keep one's situation from becoming worse is to make it better, one's situation must improve for one to avoid harm. Finally, Frankfurt says that if one remains in a bad condition, one is harmed. He justifies this last claim by noting that more of a bad thing is worse than less of it (Frankfurt, 1988, 110) . Alternately, Frankfurt could respond to the Grace case a different way. He might say that Grace is harmed because, absent the disease, she would be much better off. Grace is worse off than she was before she became ill. More generally, Frankfurt could maintain 1) that someone may be harmed if and only if they would otherwise be in a much better state and 2) that people whose bad state persists are worse off than they would otherwise be.
Neither contention is plausible. Adopting this conception of harm for the moment, however, it should be clear that one's bad state persisting does not necessarily make one worse off than one would otherwise be. Grace, for instance, would have been in a worse state if her condition had not stabilized (on any reasonable way of thinking about her state; she would have both lost the use of her legs and continued to degenerate). The fact that her bad state persists does not mean she is worse off than she would otherwise be. Saying that the relevant comparison is to the time right before Grace before got her degenerative disease will not help. Before getting her degenerative disease Grace may have had a much worse disease.
She might, for instance, have had cancer (though her cancer was removed just as she was developing
Parkinson's). If so, Frankfurt must agree that (on this conception of harm) Grace has not been harmed by becoming ill. But this is unintuitive.
The second problem for Frankfurt's account is that people do not always need those things that allow them to avoid harm. Some harm is insignificant and people do not need to avoid insignificant harm. I
do not need to wear protective clothing even if this is the only way to keep me from getting paper cuts.
Even if it is a law of nature that I will get paper cuts if I do not wear protective clothing, I do not need to wear such clothing.
Frankfurt might object that the paper cuts are not harms because they are not severe enough to constitute harms. Alternately, he could say that one does not need to wear protective clothing to avoid paper cuts because the clothing would be more harmful than the cuts.
I do not believe either of these responses goes through. First, it is more plausible that the cuts are minor harms than that they are not harms at all. Second, it is hard to see how protective clothing is harmful.
Perhaps the idea is that the social stigma surrounding full body coverings is harmful. But many people around the world do wear such clothing. So, for instance, suppose a woman in Iran could fit in quite well with a hijab that would protect her from paper cuts. Does she then need to wear a hijab? I think not, or at least not to avoid paper cuts.
Even setting aside these objections from intuition, however, there is another problem with saying that people have a basic need for full body coverings to avoid paper cuts. A good account of needs should provide a plausible basis for what, at minimum, a decent society is obligated to enable its members to secure. Decent societies do not always need to enable their subjects to secure full body coverings (even if full body coverings are necessary to avoid paper cuts).
Furthermore, decent societies are not always obligated to enable their subjects to secure even what will enable them to avoid significant harms. Sometimes undergoing significant harm can be beneficial.
Enduring significant harm may, for instance, be the only way to secure an even greater benefit. Someone with a good prognosis for recovery who must live through chemotherapy may be harmed by the therapy but still needs it. Even if chemotherapy is successful it can cause kidney malfunction, infections, blood clots, and many other serious problems for patients (National Cancer Institute, 2007) . Upon recovery patients may end up with new problems. They may even be sicker than they were when their cancer was first discovered (though they may be better off than they would otherwise be). Usually the harms that result from the treatment are less severe than those that will occur without the treatment, but they are still harms.
It may even be the case that a decent society must enable its subjects to secure chemotherapy.
Frankfurt might argue that this is not a good case because one who has to undergo chemotherapy is not harmed by the therapy but is instead helped by it. After all, without the chemotherapy those with cancer often die. At least this seems right if Frankfurt's underlying conception of harm is one on which people can only be harmed by something if they are made worse off than they would otherwise be (Kagan, 1998 Perhaps a different harm-based account of needs will fare better. In his delightful article "Fundamental Needs," Garrett Thompson argues that "X is a fundamental need for person A" if "X is a non-derivative, non-circumstantially specific and an inescapable necessary condition in order for the person A not to undergo serious harm" (Thompson, 2005, 175) . Thompson specifies that "a person is harmed when he or she is deprived of engaging in non-instrumentally valuable experiences and activities as well as the possibility of appreciating them" (Thompson, 2005, 178) .
Unfortunately, Thompson's harm based account of needs must also be rejected. There is an important ambiguity in Thompson's claim that "a person is harmed when he or she is deprived of engaging in non-instrumentally valuable experiences and activities as well as the possibility of appreciating them" (Thompson, 2005, 178) . It is not clear whether Thompson intends to indicate that: 1) A person is harmed when he or she is deprived of engaging in any non-instrumentally valuable experiences and activities as well as the possibility of appreciating them.
Or:
2) A person is harmed when he or she is deprived of engaging in all non-instrumentally valuable experiences and activities as well as the possibility of appreciating them. Finally, Thompson's account may have to contend with another general objection to harm accounts. Intuitively, some of the things people need they need not merely to avoid harm but in order to flourish. We might argue for this conclusion in several ways. If, for instance, we adopted a conception of harm on which someone can only be harmed if she is made worse off than before, we could argue as follows. In some developing countries there are ten year old children who are working and will not receive a secondary school education. On this conception of harm, these children will not be harmed by failing to receive this education: they are not made worse off than they were before if they are not educated. xxv But, intuitively, at least most of these children do need education. Intuitively, this is something that a decent society should, at a minimum, enable these children to secure because they need it.
Social Role Accounts
The minimally good human life account of needs is not the only account that can explain why people need things that they do not need to avoid harm, however. David Braybrooke's social role account in Meeting Needs has this flavor: Policy makers can determine the needs of a population via a two step process. First, they must create a list of necessary goods that enable individuals to fully carry out four social roles -citizen, worker, parent and housekeeper (Braybrooke, 1987) . Discussion is essential to determining the exact content of the list (Braybrooke, 1987) . Then, policy makers must determine the minimal standards of provision for necessary goods. These standards should be set at the level sufficient for each member of the population to carry out each social role. Braybrooke thinks that even those who choose not to occupy a particular social role need many of the same things that those who occupy all of the roles need. Unfortunately, some people do not need the things that would let them occupy Braybrooke's social roles and others need things that they do not need to occupy these roles (especially if they hope to occupy other roles). A monk may not need to have children or be a worker but may need religious freedom.
Braybrooke might not think that the monk needs religious freedom. But, even if he accepts this example, he might suggest that this freedom is just a part of the freedom of conscience necessary for the social roles at issue in his account. He might maintain that people need freedom of conscience to be good citizens, for instance. On the other hand, Braybrooke might maintain that the monk only needs the opportunity to have jobs and children. Perhaps his idea is just that people need to have the opportunity to fulfill his social roles.
Perhaps some freedom of religion is necessary for the kind of freedom of conscience people need to be good citizens, workers, parents, and housekeepers. But, it is not clear that people need the kind of religious freedom the monk needs to fulfill these roles. Furthermore, Braybrooke cannot claim that people just need to have the opportunity to fulfill his social roles. If the monk, for instance, never wants to have children nor wants the opportunity to do so, it would be strange to say he needs this opportunity. At least the monk does not need the opportunity to have children if he stays a monk who does not want children.
Braybrooke would probably respond to this last worry by saying that he is only concerned to give The account does not fall prey to the above counter-examples to harm and social role based accounts. Most rich people do not need jobs to live minimally good lives, they do need human interaction. Most monks do not need to be workers or parents to live minimally good lives, but most children need education to live such lives.
IV. The Minimally Good Human Life Account of Needs and the Desiderata
Although the minimally good human life account of needs can capture some of the advantages of and avoid some of the unintuitive consequences of the main alternatives, one might wonder whether the account fulfills the desiderata with which we started. Does it capture differences in individuals' needs and provide a plausible basis for what decent societies must enable their members to secure?
Considering the account's practical implications will help make the case that it captures the desiderata with which we started. This section will start by arguing that the account can explain why most people need many of the things that appear on traditional lists of needs like food, water, shelter, education, health care, emotional and social goods. Showing that most people need these things will make it plausible that the account provides a plausible basis for what a decent society must enable its members to secure and captures differences in individual needs. This section will conclude, however, by considering and responding to a few objections to the claim that the account fulfills these desiderata.
Practical Implications and the Desiderata
Consider, first, how those who lack basic food, water, and health care are likely to suffer from autonomy undermining disabilities. Malnutrition inhibits one's immune system's ability to fight infection and poor nutrition is linked even more directly to many non-infectious illnesses. xxxixxxii Those without basic preventative health care (e.g. immunizations) are most at risk for many of these illnesses. And those who cannot secure essential medications (e.g. dehydration salts and antibiotics) are most likely to be disabled by these diseases. Often the diseases those who lack basic food, water, and health care acquire result in severe disabilities. Sometimes they kill people. xxxiii The very sick and dead are obviously incapable of securing the kind of autonomy we have argued is necessary for and partly constitutive of a minimally good life.
xxxiv Similarly, if people lack adequate shelter they are likely to suffer from autonomy undermining disabilities. Those without adequate shelter may be exposed to environmental hazards including disasters, pollutants, parasites, and bacteria (e.g. in flood water or unsanitary living conditions). xxxv These "hazards are responsible for about a quarter of the total burden of disease worldwide, and nearly 35% in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa." xxxvi Bed nets alone could prevent a lot of autonomy undermining illness. 
V. Conclusion
The minimally good human life account, unlike its main competitors, can fulfill the desiderata for a good account of needs with which we started. Both harm and social role accounts capture some things it seems that people do not need and/or neglect other things it seems that people do need. vii Neither author uses the exact phrase "minimally good life" but, as I explain below, the exact phrase is not important.
viii As David Brink puts it, "This perfectionist conception of the significance of choice or post-deliberative desire may sound remarkably like an informed desire conception of practical reason or the good. But notice some important differences. First, an informed desire conception defines normatively significant desire by appeal to a counterfactual condition. Is the desire one which would emerge from some suitable idealization of the agent's current desires? By contrast, the perfectionist conception appeals to an historical condition. Is the desire one which was produced or is sustained by a suitable kind of deliberation?" Still, "it is choice, rather than desire, as such, that has normative significance."
See: David Brink. ix Some have suggested autonomy-based accounts of need. On such accounts, people need whatever will enable them to live autonomous lives. The problem with this account of needs is that some people cannot secure autonomy, but even these people have some needs.
x Although it will not do here to go into Hurka's argument for this conclusion, he basically uses a scientifically informed (Kripkiean) conceptual analysis to reject other perfectionist conceptions because they fail two tests. xvii This does not mean that autonomy's value is completely derivative from its role in enabling people to live a minimally good life or that the minimally good life's value depends entirely on the value of autonomy.
xviii Technically something might be partly constitutive of something which is partly constitutive of a minimally good life without being partly constitutive of a minimally good life. But we have argued that the requisite part of agency is a part of a minimally good life and autonomy is (in its entirety) a part of agency.
xix Again, the kind of reasoning and planning one must be able to do need not be particularly complex. One need not have particularly great intellectual powers, for instance, or even be able to make a complete life plan. Carrying out a plan to volunteer some weekends may be significant enough. Furthermore, it is worth repeating that there is more to a minimally good life than autonomy. xxiii Even if a person's prospects or justifiable expectations are relevant to our judgments about whether or not they are harmed, this is so in a different way than Frankfurt supposes. One might think that if a sick person has a great chance of recovery without receiving stabilizing medication but will remain in a stable state with the medication then the medication has harmed them. This is only because the person's prospects have been reduced, however. The person has been made worse off than before. Furthermore, if the person was lucky to be alive at all and the medication stabilized his or her condition, it seems that the person has benefited from the medication.
Frankfurt may have thought remaining in a bad condition was sufficient for harm because he supposed people needed to get better and deserved to do so or because he thought that people would (or should) get better. xxv There are other problems with this conception of harm as well. Recall the example of the woman who had a more serious illness before getting a degenerative disease. She is harmed by getting the degenerative disease even though she was worse off before getting the disease.
xxvi An illustration will suffice to make the distinction clear. Everyone has a non-episodic need for food even if they are currently well fed. One has an episodic need for food when one is starving.
xxvii Braybrooke does allow for the fact that the minimum standards for provision for necessary goods will vary between individuals (Braybrooke, 1987, S2.32) . He also says that not every individual must play every social role (Braybrooke, 1987, S2.45) .
xxviii In conversation Braybrooke has resisted the idea that people need children but I can see no other way that one might be a parent.
xxix Perhaps it is less clear what constitutes a good option but public debate of the sort Braybrooke suggests may help clarify the notion for the purposes of creating public policy.
